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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RENATO BARBOSA, 
: Case No. 2001085-CA 
: Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
Defendant/Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case 
involving one third degree felony conviction from a court of record. 
The trial court signed the judgment, sentence and conviction on November 17, 
2000 (R. 108-09). 
Counsel filed the notice of appeal on December 7, 2000 (R. 111). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION1 
1
 To the extent that any issue raised herein was not properly preserved at 
trial, counsel relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines to 
raise the issues on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the plain 
1. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury? 
This Court reviews the adequacy of jury instructions for correctness. See, e.g.. 
State v. Carruth, 947 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah App. 1997), ajfd, 1999 UT 107, 993 P.2d 
869. 
This issue was not raised below, so Barbosa relies on the plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. See n.l, supra. 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Barbosa's conviction? 
This Court reviews all evidence and draws all inferences in favor of the verdict, to 
determine if the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that the jury must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 
1991). Counsel will marshal the evidence which legitimately supports the verdict. 
See State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). 
It appears that counsel preserved this issue to some degree when counsel argued 
for acquittal (R. 117 at 152-163). Compare State v. Hokatte, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 
(generally, parties must raise insufficiency in the trial court); with State v. Larsen, 2000 
error doctrine. See, e ^ United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable 
probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. 
See e.g. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
2 
UT App. 106, at Tf 9 n.4, 999 P.2d 1252 (party may challenge sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal in the absence of specific motion or objection in trial court). 
To the extent that the issue was not preserved, Barbosa again relies on the plain 
error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines on appeal. See n.l, supra. He also 
raises a claim of exceptional circumstances in raising this issue.2 
PERTINENT STATUTES 
The following statutes are central to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (2000) 
76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (2000) 
76-5-301. Kidnaping 
2
 Courts will reach issues raised for the first time on appeal in exceptional 
circumstances. See, e ^ State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (incomplete 
trial procedures and change of appellate counsel constituted exceptional circumstances); 
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990)(serious procedural defects may 
constitute exceptional circumstances). 
3 
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or 
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of 
serious bodily injury; or 
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
On June 13, 2000, the State charged Mr. Barbosa by information with one count 
of attempted kidnaping, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
301, a third degree felony, for events which allegedly transpired on May 31, 2000 (R. 2). 
The court appointed the Legal Defender Association to represent Barbosa (R. 16). 
Magistrate Roger Livingston held a preliminary hearing, and ordered Barbosa 
bound over as charged (R. 22-25). 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick presided over a jury trial, and the jury convicted 
Barbosa as charged (R. 99). 
Judge Frederick sentenced Barbosa to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 105-06). 
Barbosa then retained present counsel, who filed the notice of appeal (R. 111). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
3
 Because Barbosa is raising insufficiency of the evidence in Point II, he 
states the evidence here thoroughly with an eye to the marshaling requirement. 
4 
Joshua Stephan Hansen, born October 14, 1985, was fourteen at the time of his 
trial testimony and at the time of the alleged offense (R. 117 at 42-43). 
He testified that on May 31, 2000, his mother's friend dropped him off at a park 
where he had been watching his brother play baseball (R. 117 at 44). His mother was 
late to pick him up, so he began walking to meet his friends to play basketball at a church 
some five blocks away, instructing his brother to tell his mother where he went (R. 117 at 
45-46). 
As Joshua was walking on Seventh East near 17th South, Renato Barbosa 
approached him on a motorcycle and asked him what time it was (R. 117 at 47-48, 73, 
97). Joshua said he did not know, and Barbosa asked him if he was sure he did not 
know what time it was (R. 117 at 49-50). Joshua told him it was seven or five past seven 
at the latest (R. 117 at 50). Barbosa asked Joshua where he was going and Joshua said he 
was going to play basketball with his friends (R. 117 at 50-51). Barbosa asked him if he 
had a girlfriend, and Joshua initially said he did not (R. 117 at 51). When Joshua said he 
did, Barbosa asked him, "Do you fuck her?" (R. 117 at 51). Joshua said he did not and 
Barbosa asked him, "How big is your dick?" (R. 117 at 51). Joshua said it did not matter 
and he had to go (R. 117 at 51). Barbosa said, "Well, mine's this big," and gestured with 
his index fingers to display the five inch size of his penis (R. 117 at 51). Barbosa asked 
Joshua to show him his penis and if he had a lot of hair "down there" (R. 117 at 52). 
Joshua again said no, that it did not matter, and that he really had to go (R. 117 at 52-
5 
53). Barbosa asked Joshua to show him his pubic hair and Joshua said no (R. 117 at 
53). 
At some point in the conversation, Barbosa asked Joshua if he wanted a ride 
home, and Joshua said he could walk (R. 117 at 54). About mid way through the 
conversation, Barbosa asked Joshua how old he was, and when Joshua said he was 
fourteen, Barbosa said, "Wow, you're too big for a fourteen year old (R. 117 at 55). 
As Barbosa talked with Joshua from his motorcycle, he and Joshua were ten feet 
apart (R. 117 at 55). 
Barbosa put the kickstand down on his motorcycle and put up his hand to 
measure hands with Joshua and asked Joshua to measure hands with him (R. 117 at 53, 
56). Joshua said no and that he really had to go, and Barbosa approached him, and 
grabbed his left forearm and said, "Come with me." (R. 117 at 53). Barbosa held his arm 
for two or three seconds before Joshua twisted and pulled away and ran away (R. 117 at 
54). Joshua was scared and wanted to get away (R. 117 at 61). 
Joshua turned back as he ran and saw Barbosa stand there for a couple of seconds 
and then run to his motorcycle and ride away (R. 117 at 91-93). Barbosa did not pursue 
him, injure him or threaten him in any way (R. 117 at 95). 
Joshua ran toward his home, and saw his parents drive up behind him after he had 
run about three blocks (R. 117 at 57). He got in his parents' car and told them some guy 
had grabbed him and they told him not to lie (R. 117 at 57-58). He told them he was not 
6 
lying, his mother said he was safe, and they went to the baseball field and called the 
i;ii M:> parents to the pay phone, and as his mother 
talked on the phone, he answered the .fiiesiions .is v< (,ll " he e.iiiL1 \"« tl 'V1), 
Tie told her it happened on the street before 17th South, described Barbosa as a 
white male wearing a turquoise light-weight jacket, a muhi-cuhuwl helmet ieaiK. anJ 
:
 .... .J-WWILM: plate numhci •. ; im 
motorcycle, 4T7ZU yiv.
 A i , aiOij. 
They waited for the police to arrive, and when he spoke to an officer for about 
: ,;.M aiK. ,.Mi,iia again pun ided a description of events, Barbosa and 
the motorcycle (K I P al 02). 
The next day, two detectives contacted him, and he provided them, w ith the viinr 
information he had given before, and he also picked Barbosa out of a lineup >Nk ' ~-
(vV-65). 
About a week later, the detectives came :md imi Inshii.i ;in<| II.H) him IN n ilu; 
scene to walk them through what had happened i R. _ . ui o5;. 
( ; *nurse of the investigation, Joshua spoke to several police officers, and a 
viciiiu ctUve v. - mi i!ie lii'.icei ,Hi w\\\ \ , .itt'iee, itnd lie; phiseeuinr ih i i .u Hi lie 
told the first officer all "the details and his memory was best at that time I R II /'" ,il 7C>). 
A* fhr preliminary hearing, he omitted Barbosa's requests that Joshua show him 
his - . * I. 
7 
Police officer Kevin Jones was the officer who responded to the baseball park and 
talked with Joshua, and he testified that he was dispatched at 7:19 to investigate a 
possible kidnaping, and saw no motorcycles in the vicinity (R. 117 at 101-102). He felt 
the Hansens were anxious and wanted to tell him what happened in narrative fashion, 
and that Mrs. Hansen was more upset than Joshua (R. 117 at 103). He talked to Joshua 
for half an hour, and believed that Joshua was trying to answer all questions thoroughly 
(R. 117 at 103). 
Jones conveyed information provided by Joshua to Jones' sergeant, and then 
drove by himself to the scene of the events (R. 117 at 104), He got to the scene at 
around 7:30, and traffic in the neighborhood was mild (R. 117 at 105). 
He prepared his police report that night in an effort to be thorough (R. 117 at 
106). Joshua provided a good description of events, and he detailed the conversation 
between Barbosa and Joshua in his report (R. 117 at 107-08). Joshua told him Barbosa 
asked a series of sexual questions4 and then tried to grab his hand or grabbed him by the 
arm (R. 117 at 109-110). 
Joshua did not tell Jones that Barbosa told him, "Come with me," and this would 
have been critical information in a kidnaping case (R. 117 at 110). Joshua also did not 
tell Jones that Barbosa showed him the length of his penis (R. 117 at 110). 
4
 His report indicated that Joshua told him that Barbosa asked if he had a 
girlfriend, if he fucked her, how big his dick was, if he had a lot of hair on his penis, and 
if he wanted a ride home (R. 117 at 109). 
8 
i.. • :; .« v; . -;i,/;i. .cViihcu liuii Joshua wa" running down the street very 
fast, and sensing that son letl ling 1 i lajoi I lad 1 lappei led t : • 1 iii i i, si ic ii isti t icted hei 1 n isbai id 
in pull around to him (R. 11 / at 113-115). lie got into the ear, and was w;,\ • 
telling them that he was almost kidnaped (R 117 at 11 <M After a brief conversation, 
ijic vin; no\ give Barbosa 
permission to take her son anywhere (R. . 
The defense stipulated that Barbosa was the person on the motorcycle (R. 117 at 
l. 
l i l i ' ( k ' h IIM* ( t i l l n l i V h i , . .. . ; , iu i *. .. . . i i a 
and indicated that Joshua had added details since Officer Jones'" repoi t aboi it Barbosa 
asking him how old he was, commenting about how he was big for a fourteen year old, 
uihl asking hum il he uunlal «i ride hotm J\ I I ,' «il 120-24). At the prosecutor's 
request, Jensen reinterviewed Joshi „:> . t 
the scene, and during this interview also, Joshua did not mention Barbosa's having told 
him, "Come with me. -, - " T 12'7-?0). 
S U M M / M M wt-
 t-vkuiMi..:N i_^ _ 
The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the elemeni * -' -^  ' 
error under very well established Utah law. 
1 he evidence tailed lo establish a substantial step or the requisite mens rea to 
prove attempted kidnaping. 
9 
This Court should vacate the conviction and order the charge dismissed for 
insufficient evidence. At a minimum, Barbosa is entitled to a new trial wherein the jury 
is properly instructed on the elements of the charge of attempted kidnaping. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
The elements instruction included these elements: 
1. That on or about the 31st day of May, 2000, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA, attempted to detain or restrain 
JOSHUA HANSEN; and 
2. That such attempted detention or restraint was done intentionally or 
knowingly; and 
3. That such attempted detention or restraint was against the will of 
JOSHUA HANSEN, and without authority of law; and 
4. That such attempted detention or restraint was intended to be for a 
substantial period or was without the consent of JOSHUA Hansen's parent or 
guardian. 
(R.81). 
As this Court can readily determine, the elements instruction failed to state the 
elements of attempt, which are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (2000). That 
statutes provides, 
76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
10 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor1 > intent io commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall aris*. 
(a) because the offense attempted was actual 1\ committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the nrt;u ivii,^ .u r»*. ,e 
*> u .a. ^oid -1ir? -.^ t include a separate elements instruction for attempt, or 
' '
1
^
,
' " ^ - - - - ' i ! " • . j i i r y . 
Iliis absence of an accurate elements mslrui lium -1 sal of the murder 
conviction under basic I Jtah law , See, e.g.. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1U59, 
Mau, v. Koperts, 2d 235 (Utah 1985), we stated, "The general rule is 
that an accural •> -i .i.. ; -UeiLse is essential. Failure to 
so instruct constitutes reversible ciior. h1 a i -39^ f " -^ i ^um \ • t.diiK. 
.. . . * > •« 35 [(Utah 1980)]). Se^ajso. State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 2 ^ ^Udh 
^ <• ' • Mate-,. Reedv. OH I KAi IJ S1, 1252 (Utah 1984)."). 
In reversing Barbosa' .: .a\ . ^ ;\ • m State v. 
Harmon, supra, which is very similar to this case. In Harmon i -
CUII11 reversed a conviction for attempted robbery because the trial court there failed to 
instruct the 11 in i • 111< < Irmuil tlalli iislcaJ inciels inserted the word 
attempted into the robbery elements iiisiiut ; tan nun .• »urt 
found that the trial court's error was reversible, and did not even require Harmon to order 
a '" - v.. c. lgs tor the appeal, because Utah law eiearl\ requires i corru t 
elements instruuiu . ,»..,i u ai .xcause 
11 
the jury was not instructed on the elements of the crime, the court could not say that the 
jury properly convicted Harmon of each element of the offense. Id, at 292. 
See also Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 ("... In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous."); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)(requiring jury assessment 
of any issue which increases punishment). 
Likewise in the instant matter, the trial court did not instruct the jurors that 
Barbosa could not be convicted of attempted kidnaping unless the prosecution proved he 
committed a substantial step which strongly corroborated his intent to kidnap, but simply 
inserted the word attempted into the general kidnaping elements instruction. 
The elements instruction was further flawed by omitting mens rea specifications 
for the elements that the detention was without the consent of his parent.5 
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must prove mens rea for each element of any 
5
 The elements instruction included these elements: 
1. That on or about the 31st day of May, 2000, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA, attempted to detain or restrain 
JOSHUA HANSEN; and 
2. That such attempted detention or restraint was done intentionally or 
knowingly; and 
3. That such attempted detention or restraint was against the will of 
JOSHUA HANSEN, and without authority of law; and 
4. That such attempted detention or restraint was intended to be for a 
substantial period or was without the consent of JOSHUA Hansen's parent or 
guardian. 
(R.81). 
12 
<H '-:^-vhai:: •?.-.• '•;-;. uiiuisc wr* wl\e> i^i .^  • uibini) See e.g. State v. Elton, 680 
P.2d 727, 728-29 ((Hah 14841h 
Kidnaping is not a sti let liability offense, but reqi lires proof of a knowing or 
intentional mental state as to each element. See I Itah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (2000). 
1 1: lis stati ite defn les kidi lapii lg as follow s: 
(i J .-vi^M! commits kidnaping wiici; m. inu^a ; , ;^^ .. 
without auihoril> oi \AW and against the will of the victim. 
(a) detains or IC-IMH?- another for any substantial period; or 
(b) detains or ivaian;\ another in circumstances exposing him to risk of 
serious bodily injury; or 
(c) holds another in involuiitary servitude; or 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without conse* itetit or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second deonv 
The failure of the elements instruction to accurately state the mens rea requirement 
as UP each element of the offense is also reversible error. See e.g., Elton; Lame, supra. 
ii
 ,-i. . , . :i merits 
instruction, or to the failure oi the elements instruction to require proof * 
each element of the attempted kidnaping charge, Barbosa relies on the plain error and 
mHiei.. • v as ,s . -.. u>einiK> i, addressing these matters for the first time 
on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
6
 The Elton court reversed a < mv icucn u-. ai^a^i^ sc.wu inieuoui^ i t 
because the trial court found evidence regarding the defendant's state of mind regarding,, »,iie 
alleged victim's age to be irrelevant, when in fact, the prosecution had the burden to prove that 
he acted with the requisite mens rea regarding her age. 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial righls, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e ^ State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the plain 
error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay. 184F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert-
denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. 
Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable 
probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. 
See e.g. State v.LovelL 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
Utah courts recognize that the absence of an accurate elements instruction 
constitutes plain error impacting the defendant's constitutional rights to a unanimous jury 
verdict. See Jones; Laine, supra. 
On the basis of this law, trial counsel should have objected to the failure of the 
instructions to accurately state the elements of the offense charged, and their failure to do 
so was prejudicial because it deprived Barbosa of his right to a unanimous jury verdict. 
14 
ParticUiai :- s ' - • •- ••' : ,• : i ; Lulol to 
demonstrate that Barbosa took a substantial step which \\ \-: M^ •• •- •" • ! 
..i^; A nitci,; :• justify the attempted kidnaping conviction, and otherwise failed to 
establ , the lailurc lo obtain an accurate elements instruction was 
prejudicial. i~~i v,*ui ;i, myru. 
Because the jurors were not given an adequate elements instruction, tht . 
Ciinnol SJ\ (h.ii If ie\ reached a unanimous verdict as to each element of the offense, and a 
new trial is warranted See..,, e.g., I iarmuu. v a, 
TI IE EVIDENCE WAS INSI 'FFICIENI lU SUPPORT 
THEVIRDK I 
rI :,c labi iv v» ^ % 4enee against the Jeiendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proo1 " l fulfillment of its duty to 
review the evidence and all inferences - . ua> reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretc-i 
the evidentiary fabric as far as it u h go. But this does not mean thai the 
court can take a speculate e leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
e the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt State in re J.s.H. 
; • o-P P.2d 386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 62! P 2d 1238, :M<. 
y_ A y \J\J J. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 44 ; -H 45 (Utah 1983), >%en med u, pari on .*mi. _u WUIV^ 
State v.Walket. K> F.2d 191 (Utah 198°) 
ui mi > :% ...raping conviction, the government 
should have proved beyond a reasonable doubt th. 1
 ; VM M ^ U , 
the requisite intent to kidnap Joshua b\ iiiiciiLiuiiaily oi kuovvimjK without ';iu • il 
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authority, and against the will of Joshua, detaining or restraining him for any substantial 
period, or detaining or restraining him without the consent of his parent, and took a 
substantial step which was strongly corroborative thereof.7 
The statement of facts, supra, summarizes the entire trial transcript. Marshaling 
this evidence sustains the assertions that Barbosa made sexual overtures to Joshua, a 
minor, that Joshua declined to show Barbosa his genital area and to measure his hand 
against Barbosa's and told Barbosa repeatedly that he had to be going, that Barbosa 
7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (2000) states the elements of attempt as follow: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (2000) states the elements of kidnaping as follow: 
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or 
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of 
serious bodily injury; or 
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 
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grabbed.I ^ i iii. minor "come with me,M bi it 
then let ihe minor go without ihreat, in|iin t»i -im pursuit nii;iiMA;ui .itlci Mic minor 
pulled away (R 11" at M -"'' Q ] -0>;, 
11
 \'lii!i" harhosa s conduct was certainly opprobrious, it did not rise to the level of a 
third degree felony atterm :- •-. -. 
This evidence is insuilieient as a matter of law to sustain ,i Hind decree .ilhiiiptoi 
kidnaping conv iction, because there K no c\ idence that Barbosa intended to detain 
v. ".- . >ui)sianlial period of time or without Joshua's 
parents' consent. Barbosa"s grabbing Inshna s HUM lm lm > a-iumK ami U'llinu liini 
"Come with nie^ and then letting him go without any threat or harm, when Inshu.i pulled 
aw.is did in-I constitute a substantial step which was strongly corroborative of intent to 
kidnap N ^ I • .*
 t; Petree, supra. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. 9 /o-y-/U~ Ainu; acinic scwuness a.s follows: 
! - \ person is guilty of lewdness if the person under circumstances not 
a?;it>-inii M u rape. ;^j * : ip. forcible sodoniv. :.-ruble sexual abuse. 
aggravated sexual assault. »• 1 auempi to commit di\\ of these offences, 
performs any of the following acts ii . niblic place or under circumstances 
which the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm, to, on, or in 
the presence of another who is 14 years of age 01 r: 
(a) an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female brej.M Whn\ ilir i*'»p n| 111#.• 
areola, the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area; 
(c) masturbates; 
(d) engages in trespassory voyeurism; or 
(e) any other act of lewdness. 
(?) Lewdness is a el-"" u misdemeanor. 
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Trial counsel argued insufficiency of the evidence to the jury, but did not make any 
specific related motions to the trial court (R. 117 at 152-163). 
It may be argued that the insufficiency issue was not preserved. Compare State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 (generally, parties must raise insufficiency in the trial 
court); wkh State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, at 19 n.4, 999 P.2d 1252 (party may 
challenge sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in the absence of specific motion or 
objection in trial court). 
Hence, Barbosa relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrines in addressing this matters for the first time on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error 
doctrine. See, e ^ , United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. 
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Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable 
probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. 
See e.g. State v.Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
Particularly where insufficiency of the evidence was the sole defense raised by 
counsel for Barbosa, counsel should have moved the trial court to direct a verdict of 
acquittal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 (generally, parties must raise 
insufficiency in the trial court). 
Particularly because the trial court presided over the trial and heard the 
insufficiency arguments, his failure to direct an acquittal for obvious insufficiency of the 
evidence should be viewed as plain error. 
Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits of this issue under the exceptional 
circumstances of this case to prevent the miscarriage of justice which would occur if the 
conviction were allowed to stand in the face of patently insufficient evidence.9 Exceptional 
circumstances exist in this case because the Holgate decision, requiring counsel to make 
explicit motions to preserve claims of insufficient evidence, was published less than a month 
9Courts will reach issues raised for the first time on appeal when there are 
exceptional circumstances, such as serious procedural defects, which require the courts to 
act to prevent manifest injustices. See, e.g.. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 
1987) (incomplete trial procedures and change of appellate counsel constituted 
exceptional circumstances); State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990)(serious 
procedural defects may constitute exceptional circumstances). 
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before trial, and was not released for publication until after the trial. Cf Gibbons; Jameson. 
supra, n.9. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate the conviction and order the charge dismissed for 
insufficient evidence. At a minimum, Barbosa is entitled to a new trial wherein the jury 
is properly instructed on the elements of the charge of attempted kidnaping. 
DATED this 7/[ day of l4^( ,2001. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Counsel for Mr. Barbosa 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be served two Irue and correct copies of the 
foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this 4 » C day of ^ \ ^ Y < 2J301. 
EDWARD K. BRASSV/ 
Counsel for Mr. Barbosa 
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ADDENDUM 
INSTRUCTION NO. \l^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA, 
of the offense of Attempt Kidnapping as charged in the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 31st day of May, 2000, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA, 
attempted to detain or restrain JOSHUA HANSEN; and 
2. That such attempted detention or restraint was done 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such attempted detention or restraint was against 
the will of JOSHUA HANSEN, and without authority of law; and 
4. That such attempted detention or restraint was 
intended to be for a substantial period or was without the 
consent of JOSHUA Hansen's parent or guardian. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Attempted Kidnapping as 
charged in the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
